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This article addresses recent development related to Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) – Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization - and its 
recent actions as it faces ideological and political challenges from 
other conservative Islamist organizations. In the process, NU 
seems to have engaged in backtracking its commitment to 
consistently promote moderate norms like democracy and 
tolerance toward different religious and political viewpoints. It 
examines the factors which explains this reversal and answers the 
following research puzzle: Under which socio-political conditions 
do a religious organization that has adhered to follow moderate 
political norms and discourses decide to backtrack from them and 
decide to pursue policies to embrace an ‘exclusivist moderation’? 
The article concludes the declining commitment to moderate 
norms within the NU is due to growing ideological competition 
from conservative Islamists both within and outside of the 
organization, leading NU to embrace immoderate responses to 
crack down against its competitors.  
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Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) – Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization – is long 
known as a champion of moderate political norms such as religious moderation, 
tolerance, and democracy. This was enshrined during the 1990s, when NU’s 
leading clerics and activists became frequent critic of Indonesia’s former dictator 
Suharto and contributed to his ouster during the 1998 Reformasi. However, 22 
years later, NU has come increasingly under fire for the actions of its leaders and 
activists that are contrary to the norms he had advocated above. For instance, on 
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November 27, 2019, Said Aqil Siradj – the general chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU), issued a statement that his organization is now supporting the abolishment 
of direct presidential election in Indonesia - the largest Muslim-majority country 
in the world (The Jakarta Globe, 2019). Said Aqil also delivered a speech which 
stated that NU clerics and preachers should take over all mosques, Islamic courts, 
and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. He claimed NU is “the only true moderate 
Indonesian Muslim group” - inferring that other Islamic clerics from non-NU 
organizations are harboring ‘wrong’ (read: ‘radical’) views (Atriana, 2019). 
In addition, NU is increasingly being fraught by the actions made by its 
activists to disrupt and blocked events hosted by conservative Islamic groups and 
preachers with different theological and political views from the organization. GP 
Ansor, its youth wing – has blocked rallies sponsored by Islamist groups such as 
Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and popular 
Islamist preachers like Abdul Somad and Felix Siauw, on the grounds that these 
groups are threatening the unity of the Indonesian state. Lastly, NU-affiliated 
clerics and activist have been implicated in a wave of persecution against Muslim 
minority sects such as Shi’a minorities in Sampang, East Java and Ahmadis in 
Kuningan, West Java (Suryana, 2019; Kayane, 2020; Miichi and Kayane, 2020). 
The intolerant action of NU activists against these minority groups have raises 
questions regarding the organization’s commitments to its long-cherished norms 
of tolerance and pluralism. Finally, a recent survey of Indonesian Muslims 
attitudes on the religious minorities in Indonesian politics and society revealed 
that NU members are no more tolerant than the general Muslim population in 
Indonesia. The survey also found that NU followers are more intolerant toward 
non-Muslims on a wide range of tolerance measures compared to those of 
Muhammadiyah – Indonesia’s second largest Islamic organization1 (Mietzner 
and Muhtadi, 2020: 71-77).  
                                                 
1 The survey finds, for instance, that 54 percent of NU followers objects to the construction of non-Muslim 
houses of worship within their communities, compared to 39 percent of Muhammadiyah followers. 52 
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However, despite the rich and thought-provoking data offered by the 
aforementioned studies, we still do not know the processes that lead to the 
organization’s backsliding in its commitment to democratic and tolerant norms. 
I disagree with the assertion that pluralism in the NU is merely a ‘myth’ and that 
it is merely “rhetorical instruments to defend key organizational interests” 
(Mietzner and Muhtadi, 2020: 62). Instead, I show in the article that pluralism 
and moderation is a contested norm within the NU – both when it was introduced 
and enacted by Abdurrahman Wahid and his allies during the 1980s and during 
the subsequent decades. As religious competition and decreasing religious 
authority in Indonesia increases after the Reformasi era, internal contestation over 
these norms within the NU also increases as well. It is this internal contestation 
and rivalry between moderate-leaning NU clerics and activists and those who 
adhered to more conservative theological positions within the NU that 
contributed to the inconsistent attitudes of the organization’s activists responses 
toward questions of moderation and pluralism in recent years. This internal 
competition between moderates and conservatives within the organization has 
incentivized NU leaders to adopt more exclusivist policies against its Islamist 
rivals outside of the organization as well as against its activists who have 
conservative Islamist ideological leanings in recent years.  
In this article, I argue that currently NU is backsliding into a path of 
exclusivist moderation, defined here as: the willingness of a religious group to enact and 
implement policies designed exclude their ideological rivals from the public sphere, while 
continuing the lip service of promoting moderate norms and discourses the organization has 
long advocated. Previously under Abdurrahman Wahid’s leadership, the NU was 
pursuing inclusivist moderation, defined here as: the degree by which a religious group 
is willing to moderate its theological views and political outlook and to accept and tolerate 
any political and religious viewpoints without any conditions or exceptions. The current 
                                                 
percent of NU followers also objects to non-Muslims to be elected as district heads or mayor of their 
localities, compared to 41 percent of Muhammadiyah followers (Mietzner and Muhtadi 2020: 76).  
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ideological contestation between moderate and conservative factions within the 
NU and how it affects the organization’s commitment toward moderate political 
norms is creating a research puzzle that is of interest to scholars – not just those 
who study Islam in Indonesia, but also those who study Islamic movements and 
political Islam in general. The research puzzle is:  under which socio-political 
conditions do a religious organization that has adhered to follow moderate political norms 
and discourses decide to backtrack from them and decide to pursue policies to embrace an 
exclusivist moderation, especially toward their ideological rivals? 
The first section of the article is a reflection on the inclusion-moderation 
theory, and the gaps to the theory related to how do ideological rivalry could have 
influenced a religious organization to credibly commit to pursue moderate norms 
or alternatively to lead these groups to waver from such a commitment.  However, 
the inclusion-moderation theory is not able to explain how ideological 
contestation, factionalism, and other internal dynamics within the organization 
affects the degree of commitments by the organization’s leaders to adhere to its 
commitment toward moderate norms they had supported earlier. The section also 
discusses the relevance of the NU case to enhance scholarly understanding of the 
inclusion-moderation theory. The second section analyzes NU’s ideological 
moderation under Abdurrahman Wahid’s leadership. It finds that that the 
moderate norms Wahid first promoted upon assuming office was able to be 
sustained due to the combination of his own charismatic leadership and support 
from the Suharto regime’s apparatus, enabling him to marginalize internal and 
external challenges against his rule. The third section details the growing 
ideological competition within the NU under Said Aqil Siradj’s leadership – 
driven by both internal factionalism and external competition with other 
conservative Islamist groups. It also discusses the NU leadership’s alliance with 
the Jokowi regime, the increasingly sectarian language they deployed against their 
critics both within and outside of the organization and how these contributed to 
the organization’s backsliding from consistently promoting moderate Islamic 
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norms over the past few years. Lastly, the concluding section contains lessons 
learned from the analysis of moderation backsliding within the NU, which can 
improve upon the inclusion-moderation and ‘marketplace of ideas’ theses - with 
particular emphasis on explaining how do the political actions Islamic 
movements which aligned itself with the ruling regime has contributed to the 
ongoing democratic backsliding in Indonesia.  
The methodology deployed in this article is derived from analysis of 
historical and secondary data sources that are utilized to construct analytical 
narratives which traces the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid and Said Aqil 
Siradj and how do they each handle ideological challenges from internal and 
external challenges from conservative Islamists. The process tracing method2 is 
deployed to construct analytic narratives on the NU case. Empirical data for the 
analysis is obtained through making inferences from reading historical and 
previous studies about the NU and its relations with the Indonesian state and 
other Islamic groups, analysis of Indonesian newspapers and digital media, and 
interviews with several NU clerics and activists. 
 
Inclusion – Moderation Theory: An Overview 
Originally proposed to explain the moderation of ideological parties in Europe 
and Latin America (Huntington, 1993; Mainwaring & Scully, 2003), inclusion-
moderation theory began to be applied in the case of Islamic parties and 
movements during the 2000s.3 One definition of moderation is how “institutions 
and political opportunities provide incentives for previously excluded groups to 
enter the system, abandon more radical tactics, and ‘play by the rules’” 
                                                 
2Process tracing is a methodology which utilizes historical narratives ‘to identify the intervening causal 
process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) 
and…the dependent variable’ (George and Bennett 2005: 206). This article applies the method by 
constructing analytic narratives linking the main explanatory variable (religious competition) to analyze 
the varying outcome in the commitment toward moderation within the NU during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Wahid leadership) and during the 2010s (Said Aqil Siradj’s leadership).  
3 First generation studies applying inclusion-moderation theory to Islamic parties and movements include 
Kalyvas (2000); Wickham (2004); and Schwedler (2006).  
Journal of Global Strategic Studies 





(Schwedler, 2011: 352). Another definition is “a movement away from an 
unyielding ideology to one which is more malleable” (Abdullah, 2018: 408).  
While a more nuanced definition of moderation is “the abandonment of rigid 
ideologies to accept democratic principles - including the peaceful alternation of 
power, ideological and political pluralism, and citizenship rights” (Wickham, 
2004: 206). 
Building from these definitions, I define moderation as a movement from 
an ideologically rigid political principle into one grounded on progressive political 
norms such as democracy, tolerance, and pluralism. Practitioners should at least 
tolerate other viewpoints expressed by their opponents. The promotion of these 
moderate norms should not only be conducted in words, but also in deeds - 
particularly toward one’s ideological and political opponents. Moderation also 
means a formal rejection of the application of Islamic law (sharia) as one of the 
state’s legal foundation, although some moderate Muslims might favor the 
application of the law among members of their community.  
The definition of conservative Islamists also requires an explanation. I define 
it as individuals or groups of Muslims who believe in the literal Islamic 
interpretation according to the Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophet (Sunnah). 
This includes a belief in the application of Islamic law (sharia) as a societal, legal, 
and political foundation of a Muslim-majority state. However, conservative 
Islamists usually advocates for the implementation of these beliefs through 
peaceful, democratic means such as participating in elections and peaceful 
protests. This contrasts with hard-line or radical Islamists, who often pursues their 
implementation by utilizing both verbal rhetoric and/or physical violence against 
religious minorities and other ideological opponents, such as moderate Muslims.   
Under behavioral moderation, it is assumed that Islamic parties and groups 
will follow structural and institutional changes initiated by the state and 
participate in elections and other non-violent means of political expression, 
abandoning their formerly ‘radical’ goals (e.g., advocating for an Islamic state) 
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and adopting more moderate goals and strategies. The main logic underlying 
behavioral moderation is strategic calculation (Schwedler, 2011: 352) which is 
based on a simple cost-benefit calculation reached by party or movement leaders 
to pursue peaceful political strategy such as participating in elections and peaceful 
protests given their potentially more positive payoffs rather than risking further 
state repression. Ideological moderation – which is harder to measure and 
operationalize compared to structural changes like changing regime type or policy 
– is assumed to occur after the group has participated in elections or pursued other 
non-violent political strategies (Schwedler, 2011: 355). This simplistic assumption 
was questioned by latter proponents of the theory, who argued that in addition to 
strategic calculations, ideological changes and leaders’ decisions also play an 
important role in influencing whether an Islamic group will embrace political 
moderation. Ideological moderation does not always follow behavioral ones, and 
neither change is always attributable to greater political opening (Tezcur, 2010, 
cited in Schwedler, 2011: 364).  
While the inclusion-moderation theory is now more contextualized and 
nuanced thanks to the modifications made by later scholars who incorporated 
ideational and leadership variables into their analyses, it still suffers from several 
shortcomings. The moderation process shown in most studies utilizing the theory 
is still one directional, where a religious party or group moves from radical into a 
broadly defined moderate direction. However, it is unclear whether this process 
can be reversed – either wholly or partially – in a given political context. This 
shortcoming has been rectified in several recent studies (Jaffrelot, 2013; Pahwa, 
2017). They show that these parties or groups can move back-and-forth between 
immoderate and moderate ideological positions over a long period of time, 
depending on the changing political opportunity structure that exists within a 
given period (Jaffrelot, 2013). Ideological challenge from rival factions within the 
same party or group can also force it to backtrack and pursue more ideologically 
conservative agenda from its more accommodative strategies (Pahwa, 2017). 
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Nonetheless, there are other gaps within the inclusion-moderation theory that has 
not been adequately addressed. In particular, the theory is silent on how localized 
variables such as organizational cohesion and level of religious competition faced 
by a particular religious organization helped to motivate them to either moderate 
itself further or reverse it (Pelletier, 2021: 2-3).  
How do the internal dynamics within a religious group – particularly the 
degree of competition it encounters from other co-religionist groups– affect its 
commitment to pursue moderation – can be explained through the concept of the 
marketplace of ideas. It is defined as a market of Muslim believers where 
“previously suppressed and marginalized groups could promote different 
interpretations of Islamic theology, using innovative new media outlets.” 
(Arifianto, 2020a: 39).4 As a consequence of increasing religious competition 
under this growing marketplace, Islamic religious authority – which formerly was 
dominated by clerics and activists affiliated by NU and Muhammadiyah – 
Indonesia’s two largest Islamic organizations – are increasingly being fragmented 
– as many Indonesian Muslims are now attracted to new theologically more 
conservative Islamic groups ranging from various quietist and non-political Salafi 
sects to openly political Islamist groups, such as the Islamic Defenders Front 
(FPI), Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and 
others.5 In addition, various new Islamist preachers managed to win broad 
popular appeal among Indonesian Muslims, particularly those from the 
millennial generation – due to their charismatic, populist, yet theologically 
conservative sermons that managed to attract millions of social media followers.6 
The growing influence of these new Islamic groups and preachers have 
                                                 
4 The new proselytization outlets utilized by these Islamist groups include the internet and physical outlets 
like mosques, campus preaching organizations, and community-based preaching groups (majelis taklim). 
5 For further in-depth analysis on these new Islamist groups, see for instance van Bruinessen (2013), Facal 
(2020), and Sebastian et al (2021).  
6 These popular preachers include Hanan Attaki, founder of the Hijrah Youth (Pemuda Hijrah) movement 
(8.3 million Instagram followers), Abdullah Gymnastiar, founder of the Daurat Tauhid Pesantren (5.9 
million followers), and Felix Siauw, Chinese Indonesian Muslim convert who is thought to have 
affiliated himself with HTI (4.7 million) (Arifianto 2020b: 120). 
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contributed to a growing decline in the authority of NU and Muhammadiyah, 
which as I argue in the latter sections, contributes to the political move of the 
former to align itself with the Jokowi regime and work together to push back and 
exclude many of these Islamist groups from the public sphere.  
Thanks to the growth of these new Islamic groups and preachers, along 
with new innovative outlets of religious propagation such as campus preaching 
organizations (Arifianto, 2019) and social media (Slama, 2017; Akmaliah, 2020) 
- Islamic authority in Indonesia is fragmenting further as many ordinary Muslims 
are no longer primarily relying on the authority of NU and Muhammadiyah. 
Instead, they are now able to seek and follow alternative sources of Islamic 
knowledge and authority represented by these new Islamic group, preachers, and 
political activists.  
Indonesia’s democratic transition in 1998 brought about increased 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion that makes the country to have a 
pluralist religious authority and a more competitive marketplace of ideas. 
Religious authority. – the ability to speak religious leaders authoritatively about 
one’s own religious teachings and doctrines – are increasingly being contested by 
new entrants, undermining the authority of established Islamic groups such as 
NU and Muhammadiyah (Pelletier, 2021; Arifianto, 2020a).  Hence, it is 
appropriate for us to analyze how do increased competition within the Islamic 
religious marketplace in Indonesia has affected NU’s commitment to promote 
moderate norms.  
There is certainly an ever-growing number of new scholarships regarding 
the NU and the role it has played in Indonesian politics.7 However, NU has not 
received much scholarly attention from political scientists seeking to test the 
applicability of the inclusion -moderation in Indonesia. Menchik (2014 & 2016) 
utilizes the inclusion-moderation theory to analyze NU (and Muhammadiyah) 
                                                 
7 See van Bruinessen 1994; Fealy 1998; Hefner 2000; Barton 2002; Bush 2009; Menchik 2016 & 2019; 
Kayane 2020; and Mietzner and Muhtadi 2020. 
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attitudes on (in)tolerance for religious minorities in Indonesia. However, his study 
did not outline an in-depth process detailing moderate and pluralist discourses 
were articulated, debated, and instituted within NU over the past few decades. 
Meanwhile, Pelletier (2021) applies religious economy theory to explain the 
variation in the level of religious persecution against religious minorities by 
Islamists. He finds higher level of persecution in regions where the Islamic 
religious market is more competitive and religious authority more decentralized. 
However, this study does not examine how do the level of competition faced by 
a mainstream religious group affect its willingness to credibly commit to moderate 
actions when it deals with its competitors in the religious market.  
Indonesian specialists and scholars of Islamic politics can learn a great deal 
from the study of how moderation evolved within the NU and how increased 
religious competition have contributed to the changing commitment for 
moderation within the organization. Competition for religious authority – both 
internal and external of NU – has existed in varying decrees throughout NU’s 
history. This is because it is a highly decentralized organization divided based 
upon ideologies and allegiances to different senior ulama (kyai), who served as 
factional leaders and power brokers within the organization. These senior ulama 
use both material benefits and charisma derived from genealogical linkages with 
the families of NU’s founders to gain and retain their followers. In addition, these 
ulama generally respect each other’s authority within the boundaries of the 
Islamic boarding school (pesantren) that each of them led (Barton, 2002: 139). 
However, this custom helps to create disagreement and conflict between these 
ulama when it is brought up at the organizational level. When it comes to external 
competition, NU has long differentiated itself from other Islamic competitors by 
labeling itself as a ‘traditionalist’ instead of ‘modernist’ (or more recently 
‘Islamist’) which it claims to be more compatible with Indonesian cultural 
traditions. NU leaders then utilize such differentiations in a sectarian-like manner 
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to attack, marginalize and exclude their rivals (Van Bruinessen, 1994; Bush, 
2009).  
During Wahid’s chairmanship in the 1980s, NU managed to occupy 
dominant status in the Islamic religious marketplace due to the as the Suharto 
regime’s repression of conservative Islamists during this period.  Hence NU – 
along with modernist-leaning Muhammadiyah – held a duopoly market share8 
within the Islamic religious marketplace during the 1980s and 1990s9 – so much 
so that both are considered as the official representatives of ‘moderate’ Indonesian 
Islam by the Suharto regime – a designation that continues to be applied to these 
groups by successive post-Reformasi regimes to the present day. At the same time, 
Wahid managed to deal with his rivals within NU through his utilization of 
charismatic leadership attributes and alliance with the Suharto regime during the 
early years of his chairmanship (1984 to 1990). As a result, NU faced fewer 
internal and external ideological competitors which enables Wahid and his allies 
to propagate moderate Islamic norms both within and outside of the NU with 
fewer ideological constraints. 
However, after Suharto’s downfall and subsequent democratic transition 
in 1998, the Islamic religious market becomes very competitive, given that 
hundreds of Islamic groups from a wide range of ideological and political 
perspectives are able to propagate their beliefs in Indonesia while facing no state-
imposed restrictions (until very recently). By 2010s, these new groups – ranging 
from Muslim Brotherhood’s influenced Justice and Development Party (PKS), 
Hizb-ut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) – and others are increasingly perceived as 
ideological threats by NU leadership led by Said Aqil Siradj. Within the NU, new 
                                                 
8 While there is a long history of NU versus Muhammadiyah sectarian-like animosity dated back to the 
1920s, both organizations have largely respected each other’s boundaries by the 1980s. Given the clearly 
marked ritualistic practices of both organizations, there were few conversions between the followers of 
both groups during this time.  
9 There are indications that increased competition from other Islamic groups might have reduced the number 
of followers for both groups. A recent survey estimated the number of Muhammadiyah followers at 5 
percent of Indonesian Muslims (Mietzner and Muhtadi 2020, 71). This translates to approximately 12 
million Indonesians – a much smaller number than the 30 million figure the organization often claims.  
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conservative factions such as ‘Straight Path NU’ (NU Garis Lurus) were founded 
to challenge the dominance of the moderate NU leadership. In response to these 
internal and external challenges, NU leaders put more priority to protect its status 
as one of Indonesia’s leading Islamic organization and align themselves with the 
Jokowi regime to contain their rivals using coercive measures – instead of utilizing 
democratic and tolerant norms to resolve their conflicts with Islamists.  
 
NU’s Inclusivist Moderation under Abdurrahman Wahid 
Founded in 1926, NU is an Islamic organization consisting of traditionalist-
oriented ulama and their jama’ah, with current estimated followers of 
approximately 60 million Indonesian Muslims.10 For the first six decades of its 
existence – from its 1926 founding to the pathbreaking 1984 National Congress 
(muktamar), the NU was known as an organization which supported a 
conservative interpretation of Islamic law (shari’a) similar to numerous other 
conservative Islamic organizations. During the deliberation of the National 
Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia’s Independence (BPUPKI) in June 
1945, NU leaders endorsed the Jakarta Charter – a clause proposed for the draft 
Indonesian Constitution - which would require all Indonesian Muslims to observe 
the shari’a law in their socio-political lives (Fealy, 1996: 19). The clause was 
removed from the final draft of the constitution announced after Indonesia’s 
declaration of independence in August 1945 after objections from nationalist and 
non-Muslim BPUPKI members.  
In 1959, when Indonesia’s Constituent Assembly was debating a new 
Indonesian constitution, NU representatives proposed an amendment which 
declared not only “that the Jakarta Charter be made the official preamble to the 
                                                 
10 This number is only an estimation as NU does not keep a precise tally of how many followers it actually 
has. Much of the people affiliated with this number can be considered “Cultural NU” (NU Kultural) - 
people whose ritual practices and traditions are closer to NU but are not part of the everyday activities 
and decision-making circles  of the organization – whether at national, regional, or local levels. Those 
belonging to the latter can be considered “Structural NU” (NU Struktural). 
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new Constitution, but…that the requirement for Muslims to follow the shari’a be 
added to the body of the Constitution as well” (Bush, 2009: 54). During the height 
of authoritarian Suharto rule in the 1970s, NU was able to block the government 
from enacting a secularist-oriented marriage bill that sought to limit polygamy as 
well as the authority of Islamic courts to legalize marriage (Bush, 2009: 68). 
Senior NU clerics during this period frequently issued statements that the 
Indonesian national ideology Pancasila was merely a ‘man-made ideology,’ and 
that it contradicted the Islamic belief in a monotheistic God (tauhid) (Kadir 1999: 
181). By analyzing the actions of NU leaders and activists during this period, we 
can establish that at the time NU had a conservative political theology that 
influenced its political actions. This position was taken consistently even though 
NU was willing to participate in the 1955 general election (Feith, 1962). 
By the mid-1970s, through its participation in the officially sanctioned 
Islamic party called the United Development Party (PPP), NU was one of the few 
groups expressing frequent opposition to the Suharto regime’s policy – 
particularly those related to Islamic affairs. The regime responded to NU’s 
growing opposition against its rule during this period by stripping the 
organization of its traditional position as Minister of Religious Affairs in 1972, 
which was usually awarded to a senior NU ulama for nearly two decades. The 
regime also cut subsidies for Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) ran by the NU, 
leaving clerics increasingly called for NU to stop its opposition against Suharto’s 
policies (Bush, 2009: 70-71). More measures against the organization was taken 
in 1982, when Suharto issued a new decree which required all sociopolitical 
groups and civil society organizations to adopt the national ideology Pancasila as 
their sole ideological foundation or risk losing their legal status and be classified 
as illegal organizations (Kadir, 1999: 198). 
Faced with more restrictive political opportunity structure and the threat 
of further state reprisal, NU was forced into a difficult political choice on whether 
to continue its opposition against the regime and risk further sanctions and 
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reprisal, or to accept Pancasila - which it formerly considered a man-made political 
ideology - in exchange for relief from the regime’s reprisal and the restoration of 
government subsidies to its pesantren schools and universities. In 1984, a group of 
young NU activists led by Abdurrahman Wahid took over the 1984 NU National 
Congress (muktamar) in Situbondo, with the blessing of several senior clerics who 
were dissatisfied against the organization’s former leaders (Arifianto, 2012: 112-
114). The muktamar declared that NU would withdraw from active political 
participation and would also accept Pancasila as its official ideology, ending its 
demand that Indonesia should be turned into an Islamic state. Instead, it should 
endorse the principles of human rights, religious tolerance, and pluralism – to take 
into account Indonesia’s multi-ethnic and religious society (Arifianto, 2012: 105-
107). 
Faced with more restrictive political opportunity structure and the threat 
of further state reprisal, NU was forced into a difficult political choice on whether 
to continue its opposition against the regime and risk further sanctions and 
reprisal, or to accept Pancasila - which it formerly considered a man-made political 
ideology - in exchange for relief from the regime’s reprisal and the restoration of 
government subsidies to its pesantren schools and universities. In 1984, a group of 
young NU activists led by Abdurrahman Wahid took over the 1984 NU National 
Congress (muktamar) in Situbondo, with the blessing of several senior clerics who 
were dissatisfied against the organization’s former leaders.11  
The muktamar declared that NU would withdraw from active political 
participation and would also accept Pancasila as its official ideology, ending its 
demand that the Indonesian state should be based upon Islamic principles. 
Instead, it adopted a series of Islamic principles articulated by Ahmad Siddiq – a 
senior ulama who backed Wahid’s leadership candidacy. These principles are al-
                                                 
11 The senior NU clerics who supported the leadership change orchestrated by Wahid included Kyai Haji 
(KH) As’ad Syamsul Arifin, Ahmad Siddiq, and Ali Ma’shum. They supported Wahid due to different 
rationales. As’ad lent his support in order to gain more patronage funds for his pesantren (Barton, 2002, 
149) while Siddiq and Ma’shum supported Wahid due to his family genealogy since Wahid was a 
grandson of NU’s founder KH Hasyim Asy’ari (Barton 2002: 141 & 171).  
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tawassut (moderate), al-tawazun (balance), al-i’tidal (justice), and al-tasamu (tolerance) 
(Burhani 2012: 570). By affirming these principles as those NU followers ought to follow, 
Wahid and Siddiq began to transform NU as a promoter of moderate norms – albeit with 
mixed results over the long run. However, Wahid faced resistance from other senior 
clerics within NU, mainly from older ‘political clerics’12 who used to align NU 
closely with the Suharto regime but were sidelined by Wahid. These clerics 
included Idham Chalid - the former NU chairman that was removed by Wahid – 
who formed a rival leadership team within the NU (Bush, 2009: 82) and his own 
uncle Yusuf Hasyim – who was the last living son of NU founder Hasyim Asy’ari, 
hence possessed family genealogy that outranked Wahid – Asy’ari grandson and 
threatened his legitimacy (Barton, 2002: 176). These challenges imposed a threat 
against Wahid’s power and authority as the leader of the largest and most 
dominant Islamic organization in Indonesia and his political survival.   
Wahid resolved these leadership challenges from these ‘political clerics’ 
using a two-fold strategy: 1) Utilizing his charismatic appeal based on his familial 
genealogy to gain support from senior ulama within the NU, and 2) aligning 
closer with the Suharto regime to protect him from conservative Islamic 
challengers – while at the same time he framed himself as a moderate Islamic 
cleric who extolled democratic and pluralistic norms to Indonesian Muslims. 
Charismatic appeal is an important mechanism within a highly decentralized 
Islamic organization like the NU to rally support among senior ulama who might 
otherwise use their personal autonomy to ignore decisions made by the 
organization’s leaders. It is also instrumental to assure their public support 
towards NU leaders and to minimize the likelihood of other ulama to resist and 
issue a rival claim against their authority. Such an appeal is based on deep 
                                                 
12 NU insiders made distinctions between ‘political clerics’ – those who sit on its national and regional 
leadership boards and are regularly interacting and lobbying politicians for a wide range of policies and 
favors with ‘religious clerics’ – those who take few or no part in everyday politics yet are deeply revered 
due to their spirituality and personal charisma (Bush 2009: 35-36).  
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knowledge of Islamic texts and scriptures, personal attributes, and genealogical 
linkages with founding NU families (Arifianto, 2012: 110).  
Utilizing his familial linkages as grandson of NU founder, Wahid manages 
to strengthen his power as NU chairman from the time he assumed office in 1984 
until he stepped down due to his election as Indonesia’s first democratically 
elected president in 1999. Due to such linkages, senior ulama like As’ad Syamsul 
Arifin who did not approve of the moderate norms instituted by Wahid became 
reluctant to publicly oppose him.13 Numerous other senior ulama within the NU 
were also deferential towards Wahid and did not openly criticize him and the 
reforms he brought forward inside the NU due to his perceived charismatic 
attributes as well. While there remained opposition towards Wahid and towards 
the moderate norms he promoted, few leading ulama stepped forward to 
challenge him openly. When Wahid’s uncle Yusuf Hasyim declared his 
candidacy to oppose his re-election during NU’s national congress in 1989, he 
failed to gain the minimum of 40 NU branch votes necessary to contest the post, 
which allowed Wahid to be re-elected as chairman by acclamation (Barton, 2002: 
176).  
The Suharto regime’s tough measures against ‘radical’ Islamists such as 
this certainly discouraged preachers and groups with Islamist leanings to engage 
in political mobilization and open recruitment to attract prospective converts to 
join their groups. Instead, these groups operated underground inside state 
university campuses, mosques, and other settings to recruit members through 
small, cell-like study groups to escape detection from Suharto’s intelligence 
apparatus (Arifianto, 2019: 329). While they were able to recruit a small number 
of dedicated cadres using these methods, the limited public space available under 
the Suharto regime prevented Islamists from being able to recruit large number of 
followers, leaving essentially NU – along with Muhammadiyah - as dominant 
                                                 
13 As’ad recognized that ‘Wahid was the grandson of his teacher, Kyai Hasyim Asy’ari. Thus, he had to 
defer to Wahid as he would defer out of respect to his teacher’ (Kadir 1999: 96). 
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groups within the Indonesian Muslim community during the 1980s and 1990s, 
hence clerics and activists from both groups constituted a hegemony over Islamic 
discourses and ideas in Indonesia during this period. While Islamic 
proselytization were tolerated and even encouraged by the regime, especially after 
Suharto underwent an ‘Islamic turn’ during the 1990s to bolster his support 
among the ranks of pious Muslims (Liddle, 1996), Islamists made few 
breakthroughs in obtaining mass popular appeal due to the strict public space 
restrictions imposed by the regime. Hence, NU retained its control of a significant 
share of Indonesia’s Islamic religious marketplace.  
Wahid also secured his position by aligning himself closer to the Suharto 
regime – at least during his first term as NU chairman from 1984 to 1989. Suharto 
– wary about the prospect of growing Islamism among middle class Indonesians 
enrolling in public universities– viewed Wahid, who advocated ideas such as 
compatibility between Islam and Indonesia’s national ideology Pancasila, 
religious pluralism, and religion-state separation while rejecting an Islamic state, 
as a potential ally. However, he rejected Wahid’s call to promote further political 
opening and democratic reforms (Barton, 2002: 151). In return, Wahid sought a 
closer alliance with the regime to minimize possible challenges against his power 
and authority as he consolidated his position within the NU.  
However, unlike what was implied by some scholars, Wahid was not 
complacent against Suharto’s tyrannical rule. He projected himself as an advocate 
for democracy and pluralism both within the NU and in the Indonesian public 
sphere through his regular sermons, public speeches, op-ed columns, and other 
venues. By the early 1990s, Suharto and Wahid had a fallen out after the former 
began to court conservative Islamic activists to bolster his regime standing among 
the modernist Muslim constituency – a rival of Wahid and the NU (Barton 2002: 
181).  Afterwards, Wahid moved back and forth between expressing strong 
criticisms the regime whenever there was an opportunity to do so and making 
further accommodations towards the regime when it threatened harsh measures 
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against him – for instance, Wahid’s decision to endorse Suharto’s final 
presidential term in 1996 and campaigned with his daughter Siti Hardiyanti 
Rukmana during the following year’s general election campaign (Bush, 2009: 86-
87). While some have criticized Wahid’s inconsistencies in his dealings with the 
regime, others considered that they were ‘a perfect method of dealing with an 
authoritarian regime with totalitarian aspirations’ and that ‘reactive rather than 
proactive’ response toward the regime was probably the best strategy he could 
have pursued when dealing with an unpredictable regime such as Suharto 
(Barton, 2002: 369).  
Wahid along with his counterparts mentored and inspired a new 
generation of NU activists who founded affiliate organizations and independent 
NGOs which promoted democratic and pluralist norms to NU followers during 
and after his chairmanship was concluded in 1999.14 However, despite these 
notable achievements during his chairmanship, Wahid did not nominate a clear 
successor who would further institutionalize his ideas within the organization. 
The lack of Wahid protégé who became influential NU clerics has made 
conservative clerics to continue having some influence within the organization 
and eroded the propagation of the moderate norms Wahid had introduced after 
he stood down from the organization. The rationale for this decision – and for 
Wahid’s numerous inconsistent decisions made during his tenure as NU 
chairman and later, as Indonesia’s fourth president, is best explained by Greg 
Barton: 
[Wahid] was always a tactician, not a strategist. Although he was brilliant at 
short-term political plays….he seldom showed any sign of planning for the long 
term (Barton, 2002: 369) 
 
 
                                                 
14 Young NU activists who were inspired by Wahid include Ulil Abshar Abdalla  (co-founder of the Liberal 
Islam Network (JIL), Rumadi Ahmad (current Executive Director of Lakpesdam – a NU affiliate which 
worked in the field of interfaith dialogue and peacebuilding) and Ahmad Suaedy (former Executive 
Director of the Wahid Foundation) 
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Towards Exclusivist Moderation: NU during the Reformasi Era 
The lack of continuity of Wahid’s ideas within NU was clearly seen after he was 
succeeded as Nahdlatul Ulama’s general chairman by Hasyim Muzadi, a 
prominent kyai who was more theologically conservative. He purged the young 
NU activists who were close to Wahid from PBNU immediately upon assuming 
the chairmanship (Van Bruinessen, 2010). Under Muzadi’s chairmanship, NU 
issued a clerical opinion (fatwa) condemning the minority Ahmadiyah Muslim 
sect (Brown, 2019: 408), following the fatwa issued by the Indonesian Ulema 
Council (MUI) which had condemned it earlier. Muzadi harshly criticized the 
Shi’a minorities, which have suffered from several acts of persecutions (Fealy, 
2017). Local NU ulema and activists were accused of perpetuating and 
participating in these violent incidents, particularly those occurred in Sampang, 
East Java province (Suryana, 2019; Miichi and Kayane, 2020; Kayane, 2020). 
In 2010, Muzadi – whose term as NU chairman had expired - was replaced 
by Said Aqil Siradj, a West-Java based NU scholar who had unsuccessfully 
challenged Hasyim in the race for NU chairmanship six years earlier. While Said 
Aqil was not close to the recently deceased Wahid and the NU activists who came 
under the latter’s patronage, he was perceived to have a track record expressing 
tolerant views toward religious minorities and had promised to include more 
moderate NU activists in the organization’s leadership board if he was elected 
NU chairman (Van Bruinessen, 2010). Upon assuming office, Said Aqil faced 
several challenges regarding NU’s future. During the Suharto era, NU - along 
with Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second largest Muslim organization- was 
considered to have commanded the allegiance of the majority of Indonesian 
Muslims. By 2010, both NU and Muhammadiyah face a strong competition from 
dozens of new Islamic organizations with transnational linkages to Middle 
Eastern Islamist movements (Van Bruinessen, 2015: 13), further eroding their 
authority over the Indonesian Muslim community. Aided by generous financial 
assistance from their mother organizations and their innovative usages of social 
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media technologies (Van Bruinessen, 2015: 12-14 & Arifianto, 2020a: 41), these 
new Islamist organizations have increasingly been able to compete with NU and 
Muhammadiyah and recruit their former followers – particularly those from the 
young millennial generation.  
Within NU itself, authority has become more fragmented, especially 
during Said Aqil’s chairmanship. This is because unlike Wahid, Said Aqil does 
not come from a prominent NU family or own a large pesantren.15 This hinders 
him from obtaining a large number of support base from other prominent NU 
ulama to support his policies. Former NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi partnered 
with Solahuddin Wahid – Abdurrahman’s younger brother who had a more 
conservative outlook to establish a separate faction within NU that was backed 
by most NU clerics based in East Java (interview with Asruddin Azwar, Depok, 
West Java, August 23rd 2019). Due to this lack of genealogical linkage with NU’s 
founding fathers – a necessity attribute for a senior cleric to win support and 
loyalty from other senior clerics, Said Aqil aligned himself with senior Indonesian 
political figures such as Megawati Soekarnoputri – Sukarno’s daughter and 
current PDI-P chairwoman. Hence, the strong ties between NU and PDI-P – both 
at the elite and grassroots level, help to cement their current political alliance, 
notwithstanding political frictions between Wahid and Megawati when both 
served together as Indonesian President and Vice President during the early years 
of Reformasi (Barton, 2002; Bush, 2009). 
Internal challenges against the NU leadership also came from a group of 
young NU kyai who formed “Straight Path NU” (NU Garis Lurus or NUGL) – a 
new faction which seeks NU’s return to its original founding principles and the 
removal of “liberal and pluralist ideologies” promoted by Abdurrahman Wahid 
and other reformers - on the ground they are not compatible with traditional 
                                                 
15 Said Aqil Siradj’s pesantren in Cirebon, West Java only has about 500 students (santri) – a relatively small 
number considering that many prominent NU boarding schools – like Sidogiri in Pasuruan and Tebuireng 
and Lirboyo in Jombang, have more than 10,000 santri each, a testimony to their lineage as pesantrens 
which were founded by one of NU founding kyais (interview with Asruddin Aswar, Depok, West Java, 
August 23rd, 2019).  
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Sunni Islamic (Aswaja) teachings (Iqbal, 2021: 104-105). NUGL was founded by 
Luthfi Bashori, Idrus Ramli, and Buya Yahya – all received advanced theological 
training in the Middle East and commanded large popular following both in 
person as well as in social media (Iqbal, 2021: 97-99). In addition, this NU faction 
was also supported by Abdul Somad – a Riau-born traditionalist Islamic preacher 
whom has become one of the prominent online preachers in Indonesia today. At 
the peak of his popularity Somad commanded 9.7 million Instagram followers – 
the highest among all conservative Islamist preachers (Akmaliah, 2020: 14).  
While Somad is not considered as a NUGL founder, he does hold several 
leadership positions in the provincial branch of NU Riau, including a secretary of 
the NU Riau province’s Bahtsul Masa’il (Islamic theological issues board) and a 
board member of the MUI Riau provincial branch (Iqbal 2021: 98). These 
positions give him a lot of theological legitimacy among NU followers, 
particularly those who symphatizes with NUGL agenda. The popularity of 
NUGL preachers is related to the fact that they propagate much of their preaching 
contexts via social media, which has become the most popular way for millennial-
age Muslims to access Islamic knowledge (Arbuckle-Gultom & Sirait, 2019). The 
ideological challenges from NUGL and other conservative factions within the 
NU means that the organization’s moderate-leaning leaders no longer have the 
ideological hegemony within and outside of the organization that they once did 
under the Wahid chairmanship. 
In addition, NU activists have frequently expressed concerns toward the 
Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
– PKS) and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) – the Indonesian branch of the 
transnational Hizb ut-Tahrir movement. Both groups are believed to have 
engaged in campaigns to take over the mosques and pesantrens affiliated with NU 
(van Bruinessen, 2015: 14) and their respective youth wings are thought to engage 
in aggressive recruitment of NU-affiliated students in public universities 
throughout Indonesia (Arifianto, 2019: 329-331 & Arifianto, 2020a: 41-42).  PKS 
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– through its youth wing the Islamic Muslim Students Action Union (KAMMI) 
and HTI have engaged in nationwide recruitment campaigns in the campuses of 
Indonesian state universities over the past two decades. Many university students 
– including those from NU background – were attracted to these groups because 
their egalitarian structures allowed them to advance through the ranks quickly 
compared to NU and Muhammadiyah youth preaching groups (Arifianto, 2020a: 
41-42). PKS has also persuaded some NU kyais and their children in regions like 
East Java to run for national and regional legislative positions as its candidates, 
instead of through the National Awakening Party (PKB) – NU’s electoral vehicle 
(Machmudi, 2021: 166).  
Some younger NU clerics also have an affinity towards HTI – whom they 
considered as an ally in their fight against immorality and injustice within the 
Indonesian society. For instance, a deputy head of NU’s East Java provincial 
branch states that: 
NU and HTI are ‘brothers-in-arms’ (teman seperjuangan). While they may 
deploy different tactics and strategies, they share one common goal – to enact and 
implement Islamic law within the Indonesian society (interview with KH 
Abdurrahman Navis, Surabaya, February 13rd, 2017). 
 
NU leaders are concerned against competition from new Islamist 
movements and the fragmentation of their own authority, as factions like NU 
Garis Lurus are gaining followers within the NU ranks (Iqbal, 2021: 98-99). This 
– alongside material concerns like gaining additional access to state patronage 
(Mietzner, 2018: 273-274) - motivated NU chairman Said Aqil to develop a closer 
alliance with the Jokowi regime.  
During the 2015 NU muktamar in Jombang, NU chairman Said Aqil 
announced a new theological innovation, Islam Nusantara, which is designed not 
only of consolidating the moderates’ hold over NU in the face of growing 
ideological challenges coming both from within and outside of NU. Derived from 
the term pribumisasi Islam (Islamic indigenization) coined by Wahid in an earlier 
article (Wahid, 1983), its proponents claimed that it is a synthesis which combines 
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traditionalist Islamic theology and local customs, rituals, and traditions. As NU 
chairman Said Aqil Siradj states: 
Islam Nusantara is an Indonesian-style Islam, which adopts Sunni Islam 
(Ahlusunnah wal jamaah) principles, which promotes tolerance, strengthens 
Islam as a blessing for humanity (rahmatan lil alamin), and is based on the 
principles of balance (tawazun), moderate (tawassut), tolerance (tasamu), and 
justice (i’tidal) (Hasyim 2018).  
 
Siradj further elaborates, Islam Nusantara is an affirmation of the NU to sit 
in the middle of two ideological poles, “the radical pole which is very rigid or 
strict and confrontational, and a liberal pole which is very compromising, 
permissive, and hedonist” (Siradj, 2010). NU leaders stated that Islam Nusantara 
is neither an ‘alien’ theology nor ‘liberal’ Islam. Instead, it is originated from the 
original interpretation of Sunni Islam (Ahlul Sunnah wal Jama’ah). Hence, NU 
inherits “the original interpretation of Sunni Islam that is now abandoned by most 
Middle Eastern Muslims. One that tolerates local cultural practices and also 
promotes nationalism – loyalty to one’s own country.”16  
From the very start, Islam Nusantara was framed by NU leaders as an 
antidote to the perceived ‘radicalism’ of Indonesian Islam that is thought to have 
come from the influence of Islamist groups influenced by transnational ideologies. 
These groups – HTI, Tarbiyah Movement, and various Salafi groups – are often 
lumped together as ‘Wahhabis’ or ‘Saudi-Islamists’ by Islam Nusantara 
proponents.  The latter’s acceptance of unorthodox customs and traditions has 
enabled its leaders to differentiate NU from other Sunni Islamic groups. This 
identity enables NU leaders to define itself in a sectarian-like manner. Drawing a 
metaphor similar to ‘good Muslim’ vs ‘bad Muslim’ analogy described by 
Mamdani (2004), NU and its ‘moderate’ Islam Nusantara theology is presented 
as ‘good Muslims’ vis-à-vis the ‘alien’ Islamists who brought ‘foreign’ and 
‘intolerant’ Islamic interpretations to Indonesia.  
                                                 
16 Interview with K.H. Marzuki Mustamar. General Chairman, Nahdlatul Ulama East Java Provincial 
Branch (Malang, East Java, February 7th, 2020). 
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For instance, senior NU kyai Mustofa Bisri declares that: 
…genuine Islam, Islam Nusantara….has been supplanted by Saudi Islam, a 
grasping and materialistic Islam, coarse, cruel and savage. The Wahhabi view is 
just a ghoulish nightmare that keeps the world awake at night, trembling in horror 
(Loveard 2016). 
 
Islamist groups like HTI and PKS were also portrayed by NU senior clerics 
as “agents of Arabization” (Burhani 2018: 5). The ideological and political 
struggle between NU and these groups are considered by many NU activists as 
“being at least as important, if not more so, than violent struggles in the Middle 
East and South Asia and even efforts to counter domestic 
violent extremist group” (Woodward 2017: 240). In contrast, NU leaders 
portrayed their organization as: 
promoters of moderate Islam that is compatible with the principles of the Pancasila 
and the Unitary State Republic of Indonesia  (NKRI)…Pancasila turns 
Indonesia into a religious state. However, not a single religion may dominate and 
impose its will over the others. NU and the Jokowi regime are committed to 
promote Islam Nusantara as an antidote against both liberalism and Islamic 
radicalism/Wahhabism and to safeguard Indonesia’s national unity (interview 
with KH Marzuki Mustamar, Malang, February 7th, 2020).  
 
NU’s leadership under Siradj was united to promote Islam Nusantara and 
attack conservative Islamists. To be sure, there are many critics within the 
organization who opposed Siradj’s promotion of Islam Nusantara, including his 
predecessor the late Hasyim Muzadi and clerics who are affiliated with NU Garis 
Lurus. However, since Siradj’s faction is in full control of the NU leadership 
board, he managed to sideline the critics very easily.  Hence, even though NU is 
also fraught with multiple factions and has a significant Islamist contingent within 
the organization – its leadership was willing to use strongarm tactics to 
marginalize more conservative factions and pushed them back into a more 
obscure public space.   
In sum, NU has adapted an aggressive strategy to counter the perceived 
conservative Islamist challenge against its ideological and political hegemony 
over the right to speak on behalf of Indonesian Muslims. The organization utilizes 
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its long history of differentiating itself from other Indonesian Islamic 
organizations by promoting a sectarian-like distinction between itself and 
conservative Islamists organizations whom it accuses to bring ‘foreign’ (Arabic) 
influences to divide Indonesian Muslims and to establish an Islamic or a caliphate 
state in Indonesia. This sectarian difference is also being utilized by NU leaders 
and activists to develop confrontational campaigns to disrupt the activities of 
hardline Islamist organizations that is perceived to be NU’s main rivals to win the 
heart and minds of Indonesian Muslims, particularly the millennial age 
generation.  
NU’s campaign to articulate Islam Nusantara - both nationally and 
worldwide - received a strong endorsement from the Jokowi regime, as the 
president increasingly came under pressure from the conservative Islamist groups 
and was widely considered by hardline groups to have insufficient Islamic 
credentials. Jokowi felt even more threatened by these group after the 2016 
Defending Islam rallies (Aksi Bela Islam) against former Jakarta governor and ally 
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, contributing to Purnama’s defeat and subsequent trial 
and conviction for alleged religious blasphemy (Mietzner, 2018: 272-275). In the 
aftermath of the rallies, Jokowi has been increasingly solicitous toward NU 
compared to other Islamic groups – for instance by speaking positively about Islam 
Nusantara as an ideology that is compatible with Indonesia’s national ideology in 
his various appearances in NU-related gatherings (Hamdani, 2019). 
Most importantly, Jokowi has given substantial support to NU’s 
promotion of Islam Nusantara internationally. Islam Nusantara has been adopted 
by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and promoted via official 
diplomatic channels throughout the world as a tool of Indonesia’s “soft power 
diplomacy” (Saiman, 2019). The ministry brought senior NU leaders to 
sponsored conferences and seminars promoting religious pluralism and interfaith 
dialogue overseas. In addition, Indonesian security agencies such as the National 
Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) have adopted Islam Nusantara as part of their 
Journal of Global Strategic Studies 





strategy to promote ‘moderate Islam’ to counter more ‘radical’ Islamic groups. 
The agency has supported international conferences and seminars where speakers 
from NU promoted Islam Nusantara as an antidote to radicalism and extremism 
(Mandaville and Hamid, 2018: 25). 
After aligning the NU closer to Jokowi, Said Aqil and other moderate NU 
leaders are becoming bolder in attacking their opponents, both within and outside 
of the organization. In addition to labeling his critics as ‘Wahhabis,’ NU 
chairman Said Aqil began to demand that NU should be in charge of all mosques 
and other Islamic institutions in Indonesia, in order to safeguard the country from 
conservative Islamist interpretation. In a January 27, 2019 speech, he declared 
that “all mosque prayer leaders (imams), preachers, judges (qadi), and the Minister 
of Religious Affairs have to come from NU. Otherwise, they may lead the faithful 
astray” (Nuary, 2019). Such remarks drew strong reactions from Muhammadiyah 
leaders, one of whom declared that Said Aqil’s declaration is “a dangerous 
statement that might endanger Indonesia’s national unity” (Atriana, 2019). These 
are troubling signs that NU has embraced exclusivist pluralist strategies to deal 
with ideological challenges from conservative opponents, which heightens 
sectarian divide between itself and other Indonesian Islamic organizations, 
including with Muhammadiyah.  
NU’s effort to counter radicalism and promote moderation through Islam 
Nusantara is also achieved by its closer alliance with the Indonesian state. Its 
efforts have received a strong endorsement and support from ruling regime of 
President Joko Widodo (commonly known as ‘Jokowi’). This is because president 
increasingly comes under pressure from the conservative Islamist groups, 
especially after the 2016/17 Defending Islam rallies that resulted in the re-election 
defeat of his ally, former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. The clearest 
sign of Jokowi’s favor towards NU was his selection of Ma’ruf Amin – the 
organizaton’s supreme leader (rais aam), to become his vice-presidential nominee 
on the eve of his presidential re-election campaign in 2019. This was done despite 
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the fact Amin’s theological viewpoints closely resembles those from more 
conservative NU factions. As former chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council 
(MUI) – Amin was responsible for the issuance of numerous fatwas against a 
minorities such as Ahmadis and LGBTQs, along with the ruling against former 
governor Purnama that declared him to have committed religious blasphemy, 
justifying the action of the Defending Islam supporters (Fealy, 2018b).  
NU’s alliance with the Jokowi regime has emboldened it to take tough – 
sometimes violent measures – to disrupt its Islamist opponents and exclude them 
from the public sphere. For instance, Banser, a militia group affiliated by Ansor – 
the organization’s youth wing – has frequently disrupted HTI-sponsored 
gatherings and forcefully disbanded da’wa activities conducted by popular 
Islamist preachers such as Felix Siauw - who is considered to have close ties with 
HTI (Burhani, 2018: 18). Ansor’s tactics to disrupt peaceful mobilization 
activities sponsored by HTI and Islamist organizations like FPI, has been 
criticized by human rights activists, including those affiliated with NU. One 
activist called this tactic “echoes the strategies adapted by the Indonesian Army 
to disrupt the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) activities during the mid-
1960s” before it launched a massacre against PKI members and activists in 1965 
and 1966.17  
Even peaceful social movements like #2019ChangePresident 
(#2019GantiPresiden), which happened to have many members from the ranks 
of Alumni 212 and other conservative Islamist groups, were often harassed by the 
authorities and have their rallies often forcefully disbanded by security officials 
just before the 2019 presidential campaign season started (Warburton and 
Aspinall, 2019). NU Garis Lurus website – where it propagated its views - went 
offline after 2018 – allegedly because it was shut down by the Indonesian Ministry 
of Communication and Information (Iqbal 2021).  Abdul Somad – the most 
prominent preacher affiliated with NU Garis Lurus - has been banned from 
                                                 
17 Interview with Aan Anshori, a human rights activist affiliated with NU, Surabaya, February 4th, 2020. 
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speaking in several state universities and other public institutions (Hadi, 2019). 
The initiative to limit Somad’s preaching activities seems to come from senior 
NU leaders whom have accused him to harbor sympathies to the now banned 
HTI, while also have concerns regarding his ambitions for a future leadership 
position in NU (Arbuckle-Gultom & Sirait, 2019). 
Due to the increasing state-led persecutions against conservative Islamist 
groups and activists - often backed by NU and its affiliates like Ansor - growing 
number of Indonesian scholars are calling Ansor’s actions to be no different from 
those practiced by its self-proclaimed nemesis – FPI – in “threatening those who 
have different religious ideas by halting and disbanding their activities” (Burhani 
2018: 18). Both NU and Ansor’s actions against conservative Islamist groups – 
emboldened by their alliance with the Jokowi regime - has clearly helped to 
promote further sectarian divisions between the contending groups that further 
led NU to embrace a exclusivist pluralist direction in the past few years. 
Jokowi managed to win his 2019 rematch against Prabowo and 
accordingly, NU has been rewarded by the regime with the appointment its 
supreme leader Ma’ruf Amin as his new Vice President of four of its cadres as 
ministers in the new cabinet. In the latest cabinet reshuffle conducted in 
December 2020, Ansor Chairman Yaqut Cholil Qomas was appointed as 
Ministry of Religious Affairs – a position long coveted by the NU leadership and 
its activists. However, some observers within the NU have begun to question 
whether the organization has grown too close to the Jokowi regime. A junior NU 
scholar has questioned whether the close relationship between NU and its leaders 
and the Jokowi regime has led the organization to become: 
….a little more than government-sanctioned ‘loudspeakers’ to justify any policies 
made by the president. To be a ‘progressive Islam’ has become a little more than 
backing the Jokowi-Ma’ruf regime in its totality….Gradually, ‘progressive Islam’ 
[within NU] has evolved to become ‘statist Islam.’ (Fitriyah, 2019). 
 
To conclude, NU’s promotion of Islam Nusantara and close alliance with 
the Jokowi regime has lead it to embrace exclusivist moderation – where the 
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rhetoric of NU leaders praising moderate norms like democracy and tolerance is 
increasingly contradicted by the actions of its activists who attack conservative 
NU clerics and other Islamic groups with differing theological interpretations – 
both conservative Islamists like HTI and ‘deviant’ minorities such as Ahmadi and 
Shi’a Muslims. Such rhetoric is also contradicted by the action of its leaders in 
support of the Jokowi regime’s effort to rollback democratic institutions – as seen 
in their support for the restoration of the indirect presidential election system that 
was highlighted in the introduction to this article.  
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Why and under which socio-political conditions do a religious organization that 
has adhered to follow moderate political norms and discourses decide to 
backtrack from them and decide to pursue policies to embrace an exclusivist 
moderation, especially toward their ideological rivals? This article seeks to find 
the answer to this puzzle by examining the Nahdlatul Ulama’s case. It analyzes 
the internal dynamics faced by a religious organization driven by an increasingly 
open religious marketplace and detailed how increasing competition and 
declining religious authority have lead the NU to backtrack from its commitment 
toward moderate norms that were originally initiated during the Abdurrahman 
Wahid chairmanship. Instead, the organization is increasingly pursuing 
exclusivist and illiberal policies to exclude its ideological competitors out of the 
public sphere, both on its own accord and in alliance with the state.  
The main factors which explains the changing level of commitment to 
political moderation within the NU case is the increasing competition of the 
Islamic religious marketplace and the fragmentation of religious authority faced 
by the NU starting after the Reformasi era but is particularly troublesome for the 
organization within the past decade. This competition and authority breakdown 
did not occur during Abdurrahman Wahid’s leadership – under which he was 
able to propagate moderate norms to upheld democracy and pluralism by utilizing 
a combination of charismatic leadership and alliance with the Suharto regime 
(until appx. 1990). At the same time, Wahid framed himself as a moderate Islamic 
leader who extolled pluralist and democratic values both within the NU and the 
Indonesian public space throughout his NU chairmanship. He was able to 
consistently promote these norms while also prevailed over ideological challenges 
put forward by conservative Islamist rivals both within NU and externally as well. 
Wahid and Nurcolish Madjid – his modernist counterpart – became influential 
authority figures who promoted moderate norms within constrained religious 
marketplace in Indonesia, then dominated by NU and Muhammadiyah – in a 
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time where the marketplace was closed to conservative Islamist groups which 
faced severe reprisals from the Suharto regime and could only conducted their 
activities underground.  
However, Wahid failed to prepare and implement a succession plan to 
succeed him in the NU leadership and to become standard bearers to promote 
these moderate norms, once he resigned his NU chairmanship to become 
Indonesia’s first democratically elected president in 1999. This failure to prepare 
the next generation of NU activists with potential to be future leaders of the 
organization has negative consequences for the prospect of moderation within the 
NU later on, as Indonesia’s religious marketplace was opened and quickly 
became competitive after the 1998 Reformasi. As a result, NU is increasingly losing 
authority to more conservative Islamist groups and preachers. Said Aqil and the 
NU leadership are facing a very competitive religious marketplace characterized 
by the influx of conservative Islamist organizations, alongside the emergence of 
conservative clerics within NU’s own ranks, like those who affiliated with NU 
Garis Lurus as well as Abdul Somad, who despite not being formally affiliated 
with the former is considered enough of a threat to the NU leadership that the 
organization supports the efforts to restrict his proselytization activities. 
To counter these Islamist-leaning groups and preachers NU leadership are 
promoting the Islam Nusantara ideology, aligning the organization more closely 
to the Jokowi regime and lending their support to his initiative to combat ‘radical’ 
and ‘extremist’ Islamist ideas allegedly supported by conservative Islamist groups. 
In addition, both unilaterally and in coordination with the regime, its activists 
launched strategic assaults and persecutions against its ideological rivals to 
marginalize and exclude these religious competitors from Indonesia’s public 
space. As a result, NU managed to become Jokowi’s main Islamic political ally. 
However, this alliance comes at a high price as the organization increasingly 
backtracks from its commitment toward the democratic norms it vows to support.  
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This article contributes to further the insights of the inclusion-moderation 
thesis by showing a pathway to explain internal dynamics within the 
organization, in which a religious organization might backtrack from its 
commitment to promote moderate norms after democracy has been attained. 
Utilizing the ‘marketplace of ideas’ framework to fill a theoretical gap of the 
thesis, it shows that a religious group’s declining commitment to democratic and 
pluralistic norms is a reaction for its decreasing membership and authority due to 
growing ideological competition from conservative Islamist organizations and 
clerics. I conclude that genuine support toward these norms, even in Muslim 
democracies – is not constant and can change due to changing political climate of 
the country. Since moderate Islamic organizations like NU have in the past serve 
as critical voices which provided a ‘check and balance’ role towards the 
Indonesian state –  its current alliance with the Jokowi regime poses a risk that it 
might abandon this crucial role to assure the institutionalization of democracy 
and pluralism in the largest Muslim-majority nation of the world.  
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